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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the welfare costs of in￿ ation and the welfare gains from ￿nancial
intermediation in a heterogeneous-agent economy where money is held as a store of value (as
in Bewley, 1980). Because of heterogeneous liquidity demand, transitory lump-sum money
injections can have persistent expansionary e⁄ects despite ￿ exible prices, and such e⁄ects can
be greatly ampli￿ed by the banking system through the credit channel. However, permanent
money growth can be extremely costly: With log utility functions, consumers are willing to
reduce consumption by 15% (or more) to avoid a 10% annual in￿ ation. For the same reason,
￿nancial intermediation can signi￿cantly improve welfare: The welfare costs of a collapse of the
banking system is estimated as about 10￿68% of aggregate output. These welfare implications
di⁄er dramatically from those of the existing literature.
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11 Introduction
This paper reconsiders the business-cycle and welfare e⁄ects of money by generalizing Bewley￿ s
(1980) precautionary money demand model to a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.
The model may serve as an alternative to the heterogeneous-agent cash-in-advance (CIA) model of
Lucas (1980) and the (S,s) inventory-theoretic model of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). The key
feature distinguishing Bewley￿ s model from the literature is that money is held solely as a store of
value, completely symmetric to any other asset, and is not imposed from outside nor required as
the means of payments. Agents can choose whether to hold money, depending on the costs and
bene￿ts.
By freeing money from its role of medium of exchange, Bewley￿ s approach allows one to focus
on the role of money as a pure form of liquidity so that the liquidity-preference theory of money
can be investigated more thoroughly in isolation. Beyond Bewley (1980), my generalized model is
analytically tractable; hence, it greatly simpli￿es the computation of dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium in environments with heterogeneous agents and capital accumulation, which facilitates
general-equilibrium analyses of banking and credit through the use of money.1 The model is applied
to studying some important issues in monetary literature, including (i) the business-cycle dynamics
of velocity, (ii) the welfare costs of in￿ ation, (iii) the determination of the nominal interest rate in
the money market, and (iv) the welfare costs of a collapse of the banking system.
The major ￿ndings of the paper include: (i) The model is able to produce enough variability in
velocity relative to GDP to match the data; in particular, it can explain the negative correlation
of velocity with real balances in the short run and its positive correlation with in￿ ation in the long
run. (ii) Transitory lump-sum money injections can have signi￿cant positive e⁄ects on aggregate
activities despite ￿ exible prices; and such real e⁄ects can be greatly magni￿ed by the credit chan-
nel of money supply through ￿nancial intermediation. (iii) The nominal interest rate of loans is
fundamentally di⁄erent from the rates of returns to non-monetary assets (such as capital) and does
not obey the Fisherian relationship. (iv) The welfare cost of moderate in￿ ation can be around 15%
of consumption, which is several orders larger than that estimated by Lucas (2000). (v) Financial
intermediation improves welfare and the gains are in the range of 10 ￿ 68% of aggregate output
under moderate in￿ ation, suggesting that active government policies to prevent a banking collapse
are desirable in the case of a ￿nancial crisis.
The key property of the model is an endogenously determined distribution of money holdings
1The analytical tractability of my model is achieved by assuming quasi-linear preferences as in Lagos and Wright
(2005).
2under heterogeneous liquidity preferences. Hence, lump-sum money injections have an immediate
impact on consumption for liquidity-constrained agents but not for agents with idle cash balances.
Consequently, transitory monetary shocks are expansionary (even without open market operations),
the velocity of money is countercyclical, and aggregate price appears "sticky". Financial interme-
diation ampli￿es these real e⁄ects because the injected liquidity can be reallocated from cash-rich
agents to cash-poor agents through borrowing and lending in the banking system. This generates
a signi￿cant and persistent liquidity e⁄ect on the nominal and real interest rates of loans. With
anticipated in￿ ation, permanent money growth reduces welfare signi￿cantly because of three rea-
sons: (i) Agents with large money holdings su⁄er disproportionately more from in￿ ation tax than
agents with less real balances. (ii) Anticipated in￿ ation reduces money demand; hence, the frac-
tion of the population with a binding liquidity constraint increases with in￿ ation. This generates
additional welfare costs along the extensive margin. (iii) Agents opt to switch from "cash" goods
(consumption) to "credit" goods (leisure), thereby reducing labor supply and aggregate output.2
This paper is closely related to the work of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2008). Both papers
are based on an inventory-theoretic approach and can explain the short-run dynamic behavior of
velocity and aggregate prices under monetary shocks. However, my approach di⁄ers from theirs
in several aspects. First, their model is based on the Baumol-Tobin inventory-theoretic framework
where money is not only a store of value but also a means of payment (similar to CIA models).
Second, the distribution of money holdings is exogenously given in their model; hence, the fraction
of population with the need for cash withdrawals is ￿xed and cannot respond to monetary policy.
Third, because agents are exogenously and periodically segregated from the banking system and the
CIA constraint always binds, the expansionary real e⁄ects of monetary shocks cannot be achieved
through lump-sum money injections in their model.3
Bewley￿ s model has been studied extensively in the literature. But the main body of this
literature focuses on endowment economy. For example, Imrohoroglu (1992) and Akyol (2004)
study the welfare costs of in￿ ation in the Bewley model. Like Bewley (1980), their models are
based on an endowment economy without capital accumulation and are not analytically tractable.
More importantly, these authors do not address some of the issues considered in this paper, such as
the dynamics of velocity, the monetary business cycle, the liquidity trap, the determination of the
nominal interest rate in the credit market, and the welfare gains of ￿nancial intermediation. Also,
my model captures much larger welfare costs of in￿ ation than implied by this literature.
In what follows, Section 2 presents a benchmark model without banking. It reveals some of the
basic properties of a monetary model based on liquidity preference or the precautionary motive.
2Money facilitates consumption by providing liquidity. However, consuming leisure does not require liquidity.
3For Baumol-Tobin models with endogenously segmented markets, see, Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), Chiu
(2007), Khan and Thomas (2007), and King and Thomas (2007), among others.
3Section 3 extends the benchmark model to study narrow banking. The nominal interest rate of
loans is determined and the existence of liquidity traps is proven. Section 4 concludes the paper
with remarks for future research.
2 The Benchmark Model
2.1 Individual Households
The benchmark model is a stochastic general-equilibrium version of Bewley (1980, 1983).4 Although
money is dominated in the expected rate of return, it is more liquid than non-monetary assets as
stores of value. Hence, by providing liquidity to facilitate consumption demand, money can coexist
with interest-bearing assets.5
There is a continuum of households indexed by i 2 [0;1]. As in Lucas (1980), each household
is subject to an idiosyncratic preference shock to the marginal utility of consumption, ￿(i), which
has the distribution F(￿) ￿ Pr[￿(i) ￿ ￿] with support [￿l;￿h]. Leisure enters the utility function
linearly as in Lagos and Wright (2005).6 A household chooses consumption c(i), labor supply n(i),
a non-monetary asset s(i) that pays the real rate of return r > 0, and nominal balance m(i) to
maximize lifetime utility.
To capture the liquidity role of money, assume that the decisions for labor supply and invest-
ment on interest-bearing assets (such as capital) must be made before observing the idiosyncratic
preference shock ￿(i) in each period. Thus, if there is an urge to consume in period t, money stock
is the asset that can be adjusted most quickly to bu⁄er the random preference shock.7 Borrowing
of liquidity (money) from other households is not allowed in the basic model.8 These assumptions
imply that households may ￿nd it optimal to carry money as inventories to cope with demand
uncertainty, even though money is not essential for exchange. As in the standard literature, any
aggregate uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of each period and is orthogonal to idiosyncratic
4In contrast to Bewley (1980, 1983), money does not earn interest in my model; hence the insatiability problem
discussed by Bewley does not arise. Consequently, a monetary equilibrium always exists under the Friedman rule as
long as the support of the distribution of shocks is bounded.
5Liquidity in this paper is de￿ned as the easiness to exchange for goods. Keynes wrote that an asset is more liquid
than another "if it is more certainly realisable at short notice without loss" (Keynes, 1930, Vol. II, p. 67).
6The linearity assumption simpli￿es the model by making the distribution of wealth degenerate. However, unlike
Lagos and Wright (2005), the distribution of money holdings in my model is not degenerate. This setup also makes
the results regarding the welfare costs of in￿ ation comparable to the CIA model of Cooley and Hansen (1989) based
on indivisible labor.
7This timing friction is what we need to generate a positive liquidity value of money over other assets in equilibrium.
It is a realistic friction in the sense that people may need to make consumption decisions on daily or hourly bases
due to biological needs, but do not have to make investment and working decisions as frequently. This type of timing
friction is also assumed by Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) and Akyol (2004) in endowment economies with random
income shocks. The timing friction is also akin to the transaction costs approach of Aiyagari and Gertler (1991),
Chatterjee and Corbae (1992), and Greenwood and Williamson (1989).
8To make money completely symmetric to interest-bearing assets, we can also impose borrowing constraints on
non-monetary assets. However, as long as the discounted real rate of return for such assets exceeds one, borrowing
constraints do not bind for these assets in the steady state. Hence, such constraints are ignored.












+ (1 + rt)st￿1(i) + wtnt(i) (1)
mt(i) ￿ 0; (2)
where P denotes aggregate price, w the real wage, and ￿ a lump-sum per-capita nominal transfer.
Without loss of generality, assume a = 1. Denoting f￿(i);￿(i)g as the Lagrangian multipliers for
constraints (1) and (2), respectively, the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to fc(i);n(i);s(i);m(i)g














where the expectation operator Ei denotes expectations conditional on the information set of time
t excluding ￿t(i). Hence, equations (4) and (5) re￿ ect the fact that labor supply nt(i) and asset
investment st(i) must be made before the idiosyncratic taste shocks (and hence the value of ￿t(i))
are realized. By the law of iterated expectations and the orthogonality assumption of aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks, equation (5) and (6) can be written as
1
wt











w is the marginal utility of consumption in terms of labor.
The decision rule for an individual￿ s money demand is characterized by a cuto⁄strategy, taking
as given the aggregate environment. Consider two possible cases:
9The consumption-utility function can be more general without losing analytical tractability. For example, the
model can be solved as easily if u(c) =
c(i)1￿￿
1￿￿ .
5Case A. ￿t(i) ￿ ￿￿
t. In this case the urge to consume is low. It is hence optimal to hoard money
as inventories so as to prevent possible liquidity constraints in the future. So mt(i) ￿ 0, ￿t(i) = 0
and the shadow value of good ￿t(i) = ￿Et
Pt
wt+1Pt+1. Equation (3) implies that consumption is given










+ (1 + rt)st￿1(i) ￿ st(i) + wnt(i) (9)
as real wealth net of asset investment, the budget identity (1) then implies
mt(i)
















which de￿nes the cuto⁄ ￿￿. Notice that the cuto⁄ is independent of i because wealth x(i) is
determined before the realization of ￿t(i) and all households face the same distribution of idiosyn-
cratic shocks. This property simpli￿es the computation of the general equilibrium of the model
tremendously.
Case B. ￿t(i) > ￿￿
t. In this case the urge to consume is high. It is then optimal to spend all money
in hand, so ￿t(i) > 0 and mt(i) = 0. By the resource constraint (1), we have ct(i) = xt(i), which by







. Equation (3) then implies that the shadow value









: Since ￿(i) > ￿￿, equation (8) implies ￿t(i) > 0. Notice that
the shadow value of goods, ￿(i), is higher under case B than under case A.
The above analyses imply that the expected shadow value of goods, Ei￿(i), and hence the
























measures the (shadow) rate of return to liquidity. The left-hand side of equation (11) is the
utility cost of holding one unit of real balances as inventory. The right-hand side is the expected
6gain by holding money, which takes two possible values. The ￿rst is simply the discounted next-
period utility cost of inventory (￿Et [Pt+1wt+1]
￿1) in the case of low demand (￿ ￿ ￿￿), which has
probability
R





in the case of high demand (￿ > ￿￿), which has probability
R
￿(i)>￿￿ dF(￿). The optimal cuto⁄ ￿￿
is chosen so that the marginal cost equals the expected marginal gains. Hence, the rate of return
to investment in money (liquidity) is determined by R(￿￿). Notice that R(￿￿) > 1 as long as
￿￿ < ￿h and that aggregate shocks will a⁄ect the distribution of money holdings across households
by a⁄ecting the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t. The fact R > 1 implies that the option value of one dollar exceeds one
because it provides liquidity in the case of the urge to consume. The optimal level of cash reserve
(money demand) is always such that the probability of stockout (being liquidity constrained) is
strictly positive unless the cost of holding money is zero. This inventory-theoretic formula of the
rate of return to liquidity is derived by Wen (2008) in an inventory model based on the stockout-
avoidance motive.
Since the Euler equation for interest-bearing assets is given by 1
wt = ￿Et(1+rt+1) 1
wt+1, ignoring
the covariance terms, we have R(￿￿
t) =
Pt+1
Pt (1 + rt+1). This suggests that the equilibrium rate of
return to money is positively related to the Fisherian form of nominal interest rate on non-monetary
assets. This asset-pricing implication for the value of money is similar to that discussed by Svensson
(1985) in a model with an occasional binding CIA constraint. However, as will become clear in the
next section, this shadow asset-rate of return to money is not the same as the equilibrium interest
rate in the credit market.
The cuto⁄ strategy implies that the optimal level of wealth in period t is determined by a







, which speci￿es that wealth (real money balances plus
labor income net of asset investment) is set to a target level depending on the cuto⁄ (distribution
of demand shocks) and the expected future utility. This implies that labor supply will adjust so













72.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis








(n(i)di and X =
R
x(i)di, and integrating the household decision rules over i and by the law of large numbers, the
























[￿￿ ￿ ￿(i)]dF(￿); (20)
and these two functions satisfy D(￿￿) + H(￿￿) = ￿￿.
Monetary Policy. We consider two types (regimes) of monetary policies. In the short-run
dynamic analysis, money supply shocks are purely transitory without a⁄ecting the steady-state
stock of money,
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + ￿ M"t; (21)
Mt = ￿ M + ￿t; (22)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿ M is the steady-state money supply. This policy implies the percentage
deviation of money stock follows an AR(1) process, Mt￿ ￿ M
￿ M = ￿
Mt￿1￿ ￿ M
￿ M + "t. Under this policy
regime, the steady-state in￿ ation rate is zero, ￿ = 0.
In the long-run (steady-state) analysis, money supply has a permanent growth component with,
￿t = (￿t ￿ 1)Mt￿1 (23)
log￿t = ￿log￿t￿1 + "t; "t ￿ iid(￿ ";￿2); (24)
where ￿t is the gross growth rate of money with mean ￿ ￿ and ￿ " = (1 ￿ ￿)log ￿ ￿ is the mean of the
innovation ".
The Quantity Theory. The aggregate relationship between consumption (16) and money
demand (17) implies the "Quantity" equation,





t) measures the aggregate consumption-velocity of money.10 A high velocity implies
a low demand for real balances relative to consumption. Given the support of ￿ as [￿l;￿h] and






, which has no ￿nite upper bound, in sharp contrast to CIA models. An
in￿nite velocity means that either the value of money ( 1
P ) is zero or nominal money demand (M)
is zero. On the contrary, a zero velocity (in the case ￿h = 1) implies the demand for real balances
is in￿nity (because consumption demand can never be zero given our utility function).
Steady-State Analysis. A steady state is de￿ned as the situation without aggregate uncer-








Pt￿1 is the steady-state rate of in￿ ation. Hence, the cuto⁄ ￿￿ is constant for a
given level of in￿ ation. The quantity relation (25) implies Pt
Pt￿1 = Mt
Mt￿1 in the steady state, so the
steady-state in￿ ation rate is the same as the growth rate of money.
Since by (26) the return to liquidity R must increase with ￿, the cuto⁄ ￿￿ must decrease with
￿ (because
@R(￿￿)
@￿￿ < 0). What this says is that when in￿ ation rises, the required rate of return to
liquidity must also increase accordingly in order to induce people to hold money. However, because
the cost of holding money increases with ￿, agents opt to hold less money so that the probability of
stockout (1￿F(￿￿)) rises, which forces a rise in the equilibrium shadow rate of return. By de￿nitions
(19) and (20), we have @D
@￿￿ = 1￿F(￿￿) > 0 and @H
@￿￿ = F(￿￿) > 0, so both functions decrease with ￿.
Therefore, a high rate of in￿ ation has two o⁄setting e⁄ects on aggregate consumption and money
demand. On the one hand, they both increase because of a higher equilibrium rate of return to
liquidity R; on the other hand, they both decrease because fewer households choose to hold money
when the cost of doing so increases. Since the second e⁄ect dominates, in￿ ation is welfare reducing
(see below for general-equilibrium analysis on welfare issues).
Under the Friedman rule, 1 + ￿ = ￿, we have R = 1 and ￿￿ = ￿h according to (12), and
D(￿￿) = E(￿) and H(￿￿) = ￿h ￿ E(￿) according to (19) and (20). Hence, as long as ￿h is ￿nite,
the demand for money does not become in￿nity under the Friedman rule. This is consistent with
Bewley￿ s (1983) analysis because money does not earn interest in my model. Hence, a monetary
equilibrium with positive prices always exists around the Friedman rule in my model if the support
of the idiosyncratic shocks is bounded above.
10Alternatively, we can also measure the velocity of money by aggregate income, PY = M ~ V , where ~ V ￿ V
Y
C is
the income-velocity of money.
9However, since ￿￿ is bounded below by ￿l, there must exist a maximum rate of in￿ ation ￿h
such that the highest rate of return to liquidity is given by R(￿l) =
1+￿h
￿ . At this in￿ ation rate ￿h,
we have D(￿l) = ￿l and H(￿l) = 0. That is, the optimal demand for real balances becomes zero:
M
P = wRH = 0. When the cost of holding money is so high, agents opt not to use money as the store
of value and the velocity becomes in￿nity: V = D
H = 1. The steady-state velocity is an increasing
function of in￿ ation because money demand drops faster than consumption as the in￿ ation tax
rises: @V
@￿￿ = 1
H2 fH ￿ ￿￿Fg < 0. This long-run implication is consistent with empirical data.
For example, Chiu (2007) has found using cross-country data that countries with higher average
in￿ ation also tend to have signi￿cantly higher levels of velocity.11 Such an implication cannot be
deduced from the Baumol-Tobin model with exogenously segmented asset market (see, e.g., Chiu,
2007).
Notice that positive consumption can always be supported in equilibrium without the use of
money. This is so because no agents will hold money if they anticipate others do not. For example,
consider the situation where the value of money is zero, 1
P = 0. In this case equation (11) is valid.
Equation (17) implies that H(￿￿) = 0 and ￿￿ = ￿l, so that money demand is zero. Equation (16)
implies that consumption is strictly positive because D(￿l) = ￿l > 0.12
2.3 General Equilibrium Analysis
The model of money demand outlined above can be easily embedded into a standard real business
cycle (RBC) model. For example, assume that capital is the only non-monetary asset and is
accumulated according to Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)Kt = It, where I is gross aggregate investment and ￿t
a time-varying rate of depreciation; the production technology is given by Yt = At(etKt)￿N1￿￿
t ,
where A denotes TFP, e the capacity utilization rate, which is related to the capital depreciation rate
according to the relation proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu⁄man (1988), ￿t = 1
1+!e1+!
t .13
Under perfect competition, factor prices are determined by marginal products, rt + ￿t = ￿ Yt
Kt and
wt = (1 ￿ ￿) Yt
Nt. Optimal capacity utilization implies ￿Yt
et = e!
t Kt. Market clearing implies
St = Kt+1,
R
nt(i) = Nt, and Mt = ￿ Mt = ￿ Mt￿1 +￿t, where ￿ Mt denotes aggregate money supply in
period t. Notice that equations (16), (17), and (18) with money market clearing (M = M￿1 + ￿)
implies the aggregate goods-market clearing condition,
Ct + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt = Yt: (27)
11Also see Liu, Wang, and Wright (2008) and Lucas (2000). Based on U.S. time-series data, Lucas shows that the
inverse of the velocity is negatively related to in￿ ation.
12I thank Pengfei Wang for pointing this out to me.
13Capacity utilization ampli￿es the responses of output to shocks.
10A general equilibrium is de￿ned as the sequence fCt;Yt;Nt;et;￿t;Kt+1;Mt;Pt;wt;rt;￿￿
tg, such
that all households maximize utility subject to their resource and borrowing constraints, ￿rms max-
imize pro￿ts, all markets clear, the law of large numbers holds, and the set of standard transversality
conditions is satis￿ed.14 The equations needed to solve for the general equilibrium are (7), (11), (16),
(17), (27), the production function, the capital depreciation function, ￿rms￿￿rst-order conditions
with respect to fe;K;Ng, and the law of motion for money, M = M￿1 + ￿. The aggregate model
has a unique steady state. The aggregate dynamics of the model can be solved by log-linearizing
the aggregate model around the steady state and then applying the method of Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) to ￿nd the stationary saddle path as in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
Steady-State Allocation. In the steady state, the capital-output and consumption-output




Y = 1 ￿
￿￿￿
1￿￿(1￿￿), respectively, which are the same as in
standard RBC models without money. Since r + ￿ = ￿ Y
K and w = (1 ￿ ￿)Y
N, the factor prices are
given by r = 1





1￿￿, respectively. Hence, the existence of money
in this model does not alter the steady-state saving rate, the great ratios, and the real factor
prices in the neoclassical growth model, in contrast to CIA models. However, the levels of income,
consumption, employment, and capital stock will be a⁄ected by money. These levels are given by
C = wR(￿￿)D(￿￿); Y =
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿
C; K =
￿￿






Calibration and Impulse Responses. To facilitate quantitative analysis, we assume the
idiosyncratic shocks ￿(i) follow the Pareto distribution, F(￿) = 1 ￿ ￿￿￿, with ￿ > 1 and the
support ￿ 2 (1;1). Since the support is not bounded above, monetary equilibrium with a strictly
positive price level P > 0 does not exist under the Friedman rule. Hence, our analysis in this part
of the paper treats the Friedman rule as a limiting case.15 With the Pareto distribution, we have
R(￿￿


















14Such transversality conditions include limt!1 ￿
t Kt+1
wt+1 = 0 and limt!1 ￿
t Mt
Pt+1 = 0, where
1
w is the shadow value
of capital and
1
p is the value of money.
15With the Pareto distribution, as 1 + ￿ approaches ￿, the demand for real balances approaches in￿nity. Since in
equilibrium money demand must equal money supply (which is ￿nite), this implies that the price level must approach
zero (or the value of money must approach in￿nity).
11Following the standard RBC literature, we set the time period to a quarter of a year, and ￿ = 0:99;
! = 0:4 (implying ￿ = 0:025), and ￿ = 0:3. We choose a degree of heterogeneity by setting the
shape parameter ￿ = 1:5.16 The impulse responses of the model to a 1% transitory increase in the
money stock under the ￿rst policy regime, Mt￿ ￿ M
￿ M = ￿
Mt￿1￿ ￿ M
￿ M + "t, where ￿ = 0:9, are shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Impulse Responses to 1% Money Injection.
Clearly, money is expansionary: Output, consumption, investment, and labor all increase, albeit
by a relatively small amount.17 The velocity of money decreases. The aggregate price level is
"sticky" ￿it increases by less than 0:15 percent, far less than the one-percent increase of money
stock (see the window at the bottom right corner in Figure 1). Such a "sluggish" response of
16The variance of the Pareto distribution is a decreasing function of ￿. The empirical literature based on distrib-
utions of income and wealth typically ￿nds ￿ 2 (1:1;3:5) or centered around 1:5 ￿ 2:5 (see, e.g., Wol⁄, 1996; Fermi,
1998; Levy and Levy, 2003; Clementi and Gallegati, 2005; and Nirei and Souma, 2007). Hence, ￿ = 1:5 is within the
empirical estimates. However, if we allow the degree of risk aversion to be larger than 1 in the utility function, say let
u(c) = ￿(i)
c(i)1￿￿
1￿￿ with ￿ = 2, then we can allow higher values of ￿ to yield similar results. The intuition is that risk
aversion enhances the degree of heterogeneity because heterogeneity does not matter if individuals are risk neutral.
17As will be shown in the next section, ￿nancial intermediation can signi￿cantly amplify the real e⁄ects of lump-sum
monetary injections.
12aggregate price to money is also noted by Alvarez et al. (2008) in a Baumol-Tobin inventory-
theoretic model of money demand. Thus, velocity and real money balance move in the opposite
directions at the business cycle frequency. This negative relationship is a stylized business-cycle
fact documented by Alvarez et al. (2008).
Transitory changes in the stock of money have real e⁄ects because only a fraction of the pop-
ulation are liquidity constrained and only the constrained agents will increase consumption when
nominal income is higher. Consequently, the aggregate price level will not rise proportionately to
the monetary increase. In addition, since agents opt to maintain a target level of real income-
wealth so as to provide just enough liquidity to balance the cost and bene￿t of holding money,
labor supply must increase to replenish real income when the price level rises. Also, since the
money injection is transitory (i.e., the aggregate money stock will return to its steady-state level
in the long run), the expected in￿ ation rate, Et
Pt+1
Pt , falls and the real cost of holding money is
lowered. This encourages all agents to increase money demand so as to reduce the probability of
being borrowing-constrained. Consequently, aggregate real balances rise more than aggregate con-
sumption and the measured velocity of money decreases. Lastly, if the temporary money injection
has a certain degree of persistence, then investment will also increase so as to help maintain future
income-wealth on target by enhancing the productivity of labor.








t). Suppose the real wage is constant under a transitory money injec-
tion. As long as the expected inverse of in￿ ation Et
Pt
Pt+1 rises, the rate of return to liquidity R must
fall. Hence, the cuto⁄ ￿￿ must increase because @R
@￿￿ < 0. Since the function D(￿￿) will increase
by less than H(￿￿), velocity must fall, o⁄setting the impact of the money injection on aggregate
price.18
Welfare Costs of Long-Run In￿ ation. However, permanent changes in the money stock
are no longer expansionary because of the anticipated permanently higher cost of holding money
under rational expectations. When Et
Pt
Pt+1 declines under anticipated in￿ ation, the arguments in
the previous section under transitory monetary shocks are reversed. The rate of return to liquidity
investment must increase to compensate for the cost of holding money. Hence, the cuto⁄ ￿￿ must
decrease and demand for real balances must fall. In particular, when the expected in￿ ation rate
is high enough above the critical value ￿h, money will cease to be accepted as a store of value,
optimal money demand goes to zero, and the velocity of money becomes in￿nity. In fact, in￿ ation
has two opposing e⁄ects on welfare: First, it increases the rate of return to money (R) by increasing
18It can be shown that
@D(￿￿)















H2 f[1 ￿ F]H ￿ FDg =
1
H2 fH ￿ ￿
￿Fg < 0:
13the probability of stockout and thus improves individual welfare for those who are not liquidity
constrained. Second, it reduces the purchasing power of nominal balances and therefore raises
the number of liquidity-constrained agents. Although the two e⁄ects work against each other, the
second e⁄ect dominates and the Friedman rule (as a limiting case) is thus optimal.





n(i), and the second is based on aggregate consumption C =
R
c(i)di.
Since in the steady state aggregate output, employment, and capital stock are proportional to
consumption with the coe¢ cient independent of the in￿ ation rate, the consumption-based measure
is identical to measures based on income or employment. However, because the value of money
becomes zero at high enough in￿ ation rates, the relationship between in￿ ation and the consumption-
based measure of welfare costs is not monotonic and consequently not the same as the utility-based
measure. Agents are able to avoid the in￿ ation tax by reducing money holdings when in￿ ation is
too high. This implies that the aggregate consumption level is U-shaped and becomes identical
to the Pareto-optimal level (under the Friedman rule) once the value of money reduces to zero.
However, the utility level does not always increase with consumption because it requires a high cost
of leisure to sustain a high level of consumption.
For example, with the Pareto distribution, we have R(￿) = 1+￿











Since the support of the distribution is (1;1), an interior solution for the cuto⁄ requires ￿￿ > 1,
which by (32) implies 1 + ￿ < ￿ ￿
￿￿1. If this condition is violated, then no agents will hold money
because Pr[￿(i) ￿ ￿￿] = 0 if ￿￿ ￿ 1. Hence, the maximum rate of in￿ ation to support a monetary
equilibrium is 1 + ￿h = ￿ ￿
￿￿1. For example, if the time interval is a year, ￿ = 0:95, and ￿ = 1:5,
then the maximum annual rate of in￿ ation to support a monetary equilibrium is ￿h = 185%. If
￿ = 1:1, then ￿h = 945%.



















This function is U shaped in the interval ￿ ￿ 1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿1 and has one maximum of C￿ = w ￿
￿￿1
under the Friedman rule 1 + ￿ = ￿. The other maximum is attained at the upper bound where
1 + ￿h = ￿ ￿
￿￿1. At this value of in￿ ation we have ￿￿ = 1 and the consumption level becomes
identical to C￿. Hence, if we use the consumption-based measure, welfare can be increasing with
14in￿ ation for a certain range of ￿. For example, if we follow Cooley and Hansen (1989) by measuring





then the welfare costs can be decreasing with in￿ ation under high enough in￿ ation rates. But the
consumption-based measure of welfare costs ignores the cost of leisure. In order to maintain a
high consumption level under high in￿ ation rates, labor supply also has to be high, which reduces
welfare if leisure cost is taken into consideration.
The utility-based measure, on the other hand, does not have the non-monotonic problem. The

























This function can be shown to be monotonically decreasing in ￿. The Pareto-optimal level of







2 ￿ N￿; (36)




￿￿1 is the Pareto-optimal employment under the Friedman rule.
The e⁄ects of in￿ ation on the model economy are graphed in Figure 2. The upper left window
shows the utility di⁄erence, U￿￿U, as the measure of welfare cost.19 It is monotonically increasing
with in￿ ation. The upper right window shows the consumption-based welfare cost. It is not
monotonic. Under this second measure, the welfare cost of in￿ ation is zero at the two extreme
points: the point of the Friedman rule and the point where velocity is in￿nity. In the ￿rst case, the
welfare is the highest because there is no cost to holding money. In the latter case, no agent holds
money anyway; hence, in￿ ation at and beyond ￿h has no adverse e⁄ects on aggregate consumption.
The maximum cost is more than 20% of aggregate consumption when the in￿ ation rate is about
10% a quarter or about 45% a year. The lower left window shows money demand as a function
of in￿ ation; it is downward sloping. Optimal money demand is in￿nity under the Friedman rule
because of the special feature of the Pareto distribution (not because of the reasons provided by
Bewley, 1983). It reduces to zero when ￿h = ￿ ￿
￿￿1 ￿ 1. The behavior of velocity is shown in the
lower right window. The velocity is zero when money demand is in￿nity, and it becomes in￿nity
19We use the utility di⁄erence because the utility level may be zero or negative.
15when money demand is zero at the upper bound of in￿ ation ￿h. These implications for money
demand and velocity are very di⁄erent from canonical CIA models, which imply an upper bound
of unity on velocity and a strictly positive lower bound on money demand, because agents under
the CIA constraint must hold money even with an in￿nite rate of in￿ ation. In the real world, it is
often observed that people refuse to accept domestic currency as the means of payment when the
in￿ ation rate is too high, long before it becomes in￿nity.
Figure 2. Welfare Cost and Velocity (￿ = 1:5).
In a heterogeneous-agent economy, the welfare costs, regardless how they are measured, are
potentially much higher than those in a representative-agent model because of uneven distribution
of money holdings. The larger the variance of ￿, the stronger the precautionary motive for holding
money. Agents with higher nominal balances su⁄er disproportionately larger welfare losses than
agents with smaller balances because of the concavity of the utility function. In addition, higher
in￿ ation induces all agents to hold less money, increasing the probability of being borrowing-
constrained. Hence, the larger the degree of heterogeneity (given the degree of risk aversion), the
higher is the welfare cost of in￿ ation. For example, when ￿ = 3:5, the consumption-based welfare
cost for zero in￿ ation is about 1% of aggregate consumption, and for 3% quarterly in￿ ation it is
about 1:8% of consumption. On the other hand, when ￿ = 1:5 (as in Figure 2), the consumption-
based welfare cost for zero in￿ ation is about 11:8% of consumption and for 3% quarterly in￿ ation
it is about 17% of consumption. These are extraordinary numbers. Also, the value of money
16becomes zero at a much lower rate of in￿ ation when the degree of idiosyncratic risk is higher.
These ￿ndings suggest that heterogeneity has great implications for welfare and the business cycle,
and such implications have not been fully appreciated by the literature.20
These high levels of welfare costs cannot possibly be generated from representative-agent models
unless extreme degrees of risk aversion in the representative agent￿ s utility function are assumed.
Based on such ￿ndings, it is safe to say that the welfare costs of in￿ ation may have been signi￿cantly
underestimated by Lucas (2000) and Cooley and Hansen (1989) in representative-agent models.21
Figure 3. Money Demand Curve in the Model and Data.
The realism of the calibrated model can be tested using empirical data. For example, the model
is able to rationalize the empirical "money demand" curve estimated by Lucas (2000). Using
historical data for GDP, money stock (M1), and the nominal interest rate, Lucas (2000) showed
that the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP is downward sloping against the nominal interest rate.
Lucas interpreted this downward relationship as a "money demand" curve and argued that it can
be rationalized by the Sidrauski (1967) model of money-in-the-utility. Lucas estimated that the
20An additional factor contributing to the large welfare costs of in￿ ation is that agents switch from "cash" goods
(consumption) to "credit" goods (leisure), reducing hours worked and aggregate output. Although money is not a
medium of exchange, goods consumption can be facilitated by holding money whereas leisure cannot.
21Imrohoroglu (1992) also found that heterogeneous agents in the Bewley model generate higher welfare costs of
in￿ ation. His estimate is around 1 ￿ 2% of aggregate consumption, still far smaller than what is obtained in this
paper. The reason may be that his model is an endowment economy.




where A is a scale parameter, r the nominal interest rate, and ￿ the interest elasticity of money
demand. He showed that ￿ = 0:5 gives the best ￿t. Since the "money demand" de￿ned by Lucas
is identical to the inverted velocity, a downward-sloping money demand curve is the same thing as
an upward-sloping velocity curve (namely, velocity is positively related to nominal interest rate or
in￿ ation). Analogous to Lucas, the money demand curve implied by the benchmark model of this







where A is a scale parameter, the functions fH;Dg are de￿ned by equations (20) and (19), and
the cuto⁄ ￿￿ is a function of the nominal interest rate implied by equation (26). Figure 3 shows a
surprisingly close ￿t of my theoretical model to the U.S. data.22
3 Banking, Interest Rates, and the Liquidity Trap
The key friction in the benchmark model is the borrowing constraint on nominal balance. With
this constraint, there is an ex post ine¢ ciency since some agents are holding idle balances while
others are liquidity constrained. This creates needs for risk sharing, as suggested by Lucas (1980).
However, without necessary information- and record-keeping technologies, households cannot lend
and borrow among themselves. In this section, we assume that a community bank emerges to
resolve the risk-sharing problem by developing the required information technologies. The function
of the bank is to accept nominal deposits from households and make nominal loans to those in
need. For simplicity, we assume that deposits do not pay interest and all households voluntarily
deposit their idle cash into the bank as a safety net. The bene￿t of making deposits is that bank
members are quali￿ed for loans when needed. This provides enough incentives for agents in the
community to pull together their cash resources. Assume all deposits are withdrawn at the end
of each period (100-percent reserve banking), and all loans are one-period loans that charge the
competitive nominal interest rate 1+~ {, which is determined by the demand and supply of loans in
the community. Any pro￿ts earned by the bank are redistributed back to community members as
lump-sum transfers.
22The circles in Figure 3 show plots of annual time series of a short-term nominal interest rate (the commercial
paper rate) against the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP, for the United States for the period 1892￿ 1997. The data are
taken from the online Historical Statistics of the United States￿ Millennium Edition. The solid line with star symbols
is the model￿ s prediction calibrated at annual frequency with ￿ = 0:96 and ￿ = 0:1. The other parameters remain the
same; namely, ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 1:5. The nominal interest rate in the model is de￿ned as
1+￿
￿ . The scale parameter
is set to A = 0:125.
18Similar banking arrangements have been studied recently by Berentsen, Camera, and Waller
(2006) and others. This literature shows that ￿nancial intermediation improves welfare.23 However,
these authors study the issue in the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005), which has no capital
accumulation and aggregate uncertainty, and they do not analyze the issue of the liquidity trap. In
addition, in their model the welfare gains of ￿nancial intermediation come solely from the payment
of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers￿liquidity constraints. In sharp contrast,
gains in welfare in this paper derive entirely from relaxing borrowers￿liquidity constraints.
The time line of events is as follows: In the beginning of each period, aggregate shocks are
realized, each household then makes decisions on labor supply and capital investment, taking as
given the initial wealth from last period. After that, idiosyncratic preference shocks are realized,
and each household chooses consumption, the amount of nominal balances to be carried over to
the next period, and the size of new loans if needed. Given such an environment, it is clear that
agents with idle cash will not take a loan in that period and that agents who take loans must be
cash constrained. It is also possible for a cash-constrained agent not to take any loans if the urge to
consume is not high enough to justify the interest rate on a loan. Hence, in terms of cash balances,
there may exist three types of households in each period: depositors, borrowers, and agents with
zero deposits and loans.
Household i takes the bank￿ s real pro￿t income (T) and government money transfers (￿) as given,





￿t f￿(i)logc(i) ￿ n(i)g
subject to
ct(i) + kt+1(i) +
mt(i)
Pt
+ (1 +~ {t)
bt￿1(i)
Pt






+ wtnt(i) + Tt (39)
mt(i) ￿ 0 (40)
bt(i) ￿ 0; (41)
where~ { denotes the nominal loan rate and r the rental rate of capital. The non-negativity constraints
on nominal balances (mt) and loans (bt) capture the idea that households cannot borrow or lend
outside the banking system. As in the benchmark model, hours worked and non-monetary asset
investment in each period must be determined before the idiosyncratic preference shock ￿t(i) is
realized.
23However, Chiu and Meh (2008) show that banking may reduce welfare under moderate in￿ ation rates if there
exist transaction costs for using ￿nancial intermediation. For alternative approaches to money and banking, see




as Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (39)-(41), respectively, the ￿rst-




1 = wtEi￿t(i) (43)















Note that there are three possible situations for money demand: (i) If mt(i) > 0, then bt(i) = 0;
namely, a household has no incentive to take a loan if it has idle cash in hand. (ii) If bt(i) > 0,
then mt(i) = 0; namely, a household will take a loan only if it runs out of cash. (iii) It is possible
that a household has no cash in hand but does not want to borrow money from the bank because
the interest rate is too high; namely, mt(i) = bt(i) = 0. Which of the three situations prevails
in each period depends on the realized value of the preference shock ￿t(i). There exist two cuto⁄
values, ￿ and ￿ ￿ with ￿ < ￿ ￿. If ￿(i) < ￿, the urge to consume is low, then mt(i) > 0; if ￿(i) > ￿, the





determined endogenously by the households.
The analyses of each case proceed as follows. By the law of iterated expectations and by the
orthogonality condition between the idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate shocks, equations (44)-(46)
can be rewritten (by using equation 43) as:
1
wt


















Case A. mt(i) > 0;bt(i) = 0;￿m
t (i) = 0. Equation (47) implies ￿t(i) = ￿Et
Pt
Pt+1wt+1; equation









+ wtnt(i) + Tt ￿ (1 +~ {t)
bt￿1
Pt
+ (1 + rt)kt(i) ￿ kt+1(i);










which de￿nes the lower cuto⁄ value ￿.
Case B. bt(i) > 0;mt(i) = 0;￿b
t(i) = 0. Equation (49) implies ￿t(i) = ￿Et(1 + ~ {t+1) Pt
Pt+1wt+1;
equation (42) implies ct(i) = ￿(i)
h
￿E(1 +~ {t+1) Pt
Pt+1wt+1
i￿1
. The budget constraint implies bt(i) =
￿xt(i) + ￿(i)
h
￿E(1 +~ {t+1) Pt
Pt+1wt+1
i￿1
> 0, which implies




which de￿nes the upper cuto⁄ value ￿. Clearly, ￿t ￿ ￿t if and only if ~ {t ￿ 0 for all t.





and xt(i) ￿ ￿ ￿t
h













Notice that the lower and the upper cuto⁄ values depend on aggregate economic conditions and
hence both are time varying.
































measures the equilibrium rate of return to liquidity in the model of narrow banking. Notice that
Rt ￿ 1 if and only if ￿t ￿ ￿t. As in the benchmark model, R = 1+￿
￿ in the steady state.
21Individuals￿decision rules can be summarized by
ct(i) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
￿(i)wtRt if ￿(i) < ￿
￿wtRt if ￿ ￿ ￿(i) ￿ ￿
￿(i)








[￿ ￿ ￿(i)]wtRt if ￿(i) < ￿














wtRt if ￿(i) > ￿
(57)
xt(i) = ￿wtRt: (58)
Aggregating these decision rules across households gives

























+ wtNt + Tt ￿ (1 +~ {t)
Bt￿1
Pt
+ (1 + rt)Kt ￿ Kt+1 = wtRt￿; (62)





























dF(￿) > 0 (65)
and the three functions satisfy the identity
D + H ￿ G = ￿: (66)
22In the credit market, the aggregate supply of credit is Mt and the aggregate demand is B(~ {t).
Note credit demand cannot exceed supply because the loan rate will always rise to clear the market,
and the nominal loan rate cannot be negative because people have the option not to deposit. Hence,
the credit market-clearing conditions are characterized by the following complementarity conditions:
(Mt ￿ Bt)~ {t = 0; Mt ￿ Bt;~ {t ￿ 0: (67)
That is, the nominal loan rate is zero if liquidity supply exceeds its demand. On the other hand, if
credit demand exceeds supply, the nominal interest rate will rise to clear the market. Notice that
the bank does not accumulate reserves because all reserves are redistributed back to bank members
by the end of each period. The bank￿ s balance sheet is given by
Mt |{z}
deposit









where the left-hand side is total in￿ ow of liquidity in period t and the right-hand side is total
out￿ ow of liquidity in period t. That is, in the beginning of period t the bank accepts deposit Mt
and makes new loans Bt, and at the end of period t it receives loan payment (1 +~ {t+1)Bt and faces
withdrawal of Mt. Any pro￿ts are distributed back to households in a lump sum at the end of
period t in the amount Tt+1, which becomes household income in the beginning of the next period.
3.1 The Liquidity Trap
Suppose the steady-state in￿ ation rate is ￿ and the real wage is w. In a steady state, equations






















(M ￿ B)~ { = 0; M ￿ B ￿ 0; ~ { ￿ 0; (74)
where the functions fR;D;H;Gg are de￿ned in equations (54), (63), (64), and (65).





￿ ￿ E(￿) ￿ ￿.
Proof. First, by (54), it is clear that R(￿;￿ ￿) = 1 if and only if ￿ = ￿; and R > 1 if and only if
￿ > ￿. Hence, by (69) we have 1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿. Second, since ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, we have ~ { ￿ 0
and M = B. But M = B is equivalent to H(￿) = G(￿;￿ ￿) or
Z
￿(i)<￿









which, by rearranging, implies
￿







































When 1 + ￿ = ￿, ￿ = ￿, the above equation implies the solution ￿ = ￿ =
R
￿dF(￿) (= E(￿)).
When 1 + ￿ > ￿, ￿ > ￿, the above equation implies that, for any value of ￿ < E(￿), there exists a
￿ > E(￿) such that the area measured by the left-hand-side of (75) equals the area measured by the
right-hand-side of (75) for any non-degenerated distributions. Plugging this relationship implied
by (75), ￿(￿), into the continuous and single-valued relation R(￿;￿) = 1+￿
￿ uniquely determines the
value of ￿. Given ￿, ￿ ￿ can then be uniquely determined by (75).
Proposition 2 Suppose the support of the distribution is given by [￿l;￿h] with ￿h > ￿l > ￿1.
Then there exists a ￿nite upper limit (￿h) of the in￿ation rate such that, if ￿ = ￿h, then the
optimal demand for real balances M
P = 0; namely, no household is willing to hold cash if in￿ation
is at or above ￿h.
Proof. By (54), we have @R
@￿ < 0 and @R
@￿ ￿ > 0. Hence, given the support of ￿, the maxim value of
R (Rmax) is reached either when ￿ = ￿l or ￿ ￿ = ￿h or both. By Proposition 1 and (75), ￿ = ￿l if
and only if ￿ ￿ = ￿h. Hence, there exists ￿h such that R is at its maximum value Rmax =
1+￿h
￿ if
and only if ￿ = ￿l. Then by (64), we have H(￿) = 0; and by (72), we have M
P = 0. Since there is
24no credit supply in the banking system, we must also have B
P = 0 in equilibrium regardless of the
nominal loan rate.
Proposition 3 (The Liquidity Trap) There exists a lower limit on the in￿ation rate, ￿l = ￿ ￿ 1,
such that if ￿ < ￿l, then ~ {t = 0 and M > B. Namely, households opt to hoard too much cash such
that the aggregate credit supply (deposits) exceeds credit demand even with a zero interest rate on
loans.
Proof. The function R(￿;￿) is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in ￿. Also, if ￿ ￿ ￿, then the










￿ 1; if ￿ < ￿, then













Hence, R Q 1 if and only if ￿ Q ￿. It is also true that R Q 1 if and only if ￿ Q ￿ ￿ 1. Therefore,
when ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, R ￿ 1, we must also have ￿ ￿ ￿. However, for equation (75) to hold (i.e., under
the condition M = B), it must be true that ￿ ￿ E(￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ if ￿ ￿ ￿. Since 1 + ~ { = ￿=￿ and the
nominal interest rate cannot be negative, we cannot have ￿ < ￿. Therefore, there exists a lower
limit ￿l = ￿ ￿ 1, at which point R = 1;￿ = ￿; and ~ { = 0; and whenever ￿ < ￿l, we must violate
equation (75) so that H(￿) > G(￿;￿ ￿ = ￿) (i.e., M > B at the point ~ { = 0) because H(￿) (credit
supply) is increasing in ￿ while G(￿;￿ ￿ = ￿) (loan demand at zero interest rate) is decreasing in ￿










￿(i)>￿ [￿(i) ￿ ￿]dF(￿)).
Proposition 4 Velocity increases with in￿ation.
Proof. V =
D(￿;￿)









increases as ￿ increases; hence, V increases with ￿.
In a liquidity trap, money is such an attractive asset to hold that any additional money injection
will be hoarded by the private sector, thus increasing liquidity supply (deposits) in the banking
system. On the other hand, since the nominal interest rate on loans cannot decrease below zero,
the demand for loans will not be further stimulated to absorb the excess supply of liquidity. Hence,
monetary policy will cease to be e⁄ective in stimulating credit demand and aggregate spending
through the credit channel of the banking system.
If banks use deposits to invest in ￿nancial assets such as a one-period government bonds, then
in equilibrium the nominal interest rate on government bonds must equal the loan rate 1 +~ {t. In
this case, an open-market operation by the government has the same e⁄ects of a lump-sum money
injection because we assume households always deposit idle balances into the banking system.
Another important feature of the liquidity trap is that money demand does not become in￿nity
25at the trap, nor does the demand for loans become zero.24 This is in contrast to the argument of
Grandmont and Laroque (1976).
3.2 Welfare Gains of Financial Intermediation
The model can be closed by adding production and capital accumulation in the same way as in
the benchmark model. Namely, on the ￿rm side we have Yt = At(etKt)￿N1￿￿
t ; ￿t = 1
1+!e1+!
t ;
wt = (1 ￿ ￿) Yt
Nt; rt ￿ ￿t = ￿ Yt
Kt; and ￿Yt
et = e!
t Kt. The goods market-clearing condition is given by
Ct + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt = Yt: (76)
As in the benchmark model, we consider two types of monetary policies and the aggregate money
stock evolves according to
Mt = Mt￿1 + ￿t; (77)
where money injection ￿t follows either policy (21) or policy (23).





which satis￿es equations (47), (52), (53), (59), (60), (61), (62), (67), (76), (77), the production func-
tion, the capital depreciation function, and ￿rms￿￿rst-order conditions with respect to fet;Kt;Ntg,
as well as standard transversality conditions.25 The model has a unique steady state in which the




Y = 1 ￿
￿￿￿






1 + r = 1
￿.
Consider the Pareto distribution F(￿) = 1 ￿ ￿￿￿, with support ￿ 2 (1;1) and the shape
























(￿ ￿ 1)2 ￿ N￿; (79)




￿￿1 is the Pareto-optimal employment under the Friedman rule.
Equation (79) looks identical to equation (36) because the optimal allocations are the same under
Friedman rule with or without ￿nancial intermediation. Comparing equation (78) with equation
24With banking, the Friedman rule implies ￿ = ￿ ￿ = E￿; hence, the money demand function is always ￿nite valued
even if the support of ￿ is unbounded.
25The transversality conditions are the same as in the benchmark model.
26(35), it is clear that ￿nancial intermediation improves welfare mainly because of the extra term ￿ ￿
1￿￿,
which re￿ ects the utility gains from additional consumption by relaxing the borrowing constraint
through credit lending.
Figure 4 shows the welfare gains of ￿nancial intermediation based on the two measures of
welfare, one by utility di⁄erence (Ubank ￿ U0) and the other by consumption ratio (Cbank=C0),
where Ubank denotes aggregate utility with banking and U0 the counterpart in the benchmark
model. Similar notations apply to aggregate consumption. The top window in Figure 4 shows that
￿nancial intermediation improves welfare signi￿cantly. This is especially the case for moderate
values of in￿ ation. Near the Friedman rule there is little gain from risk sharing because agents can
perfectly self-insure against consumption risk when the cost of holding money is zero. For high
in￿ ation rates the value of money is low, so redistributing idle cash balances does not signi￿cantly
improve welfare. Similar results are also obtained by Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2006) in the
Lagos-Wright (2005) framework.
Figure 4. Welfare Gains from Banking.
However, the bottom window in Figure 4 shows that ￿nancial intermediation does not necessarily
improve welfare if welfare is measured by consumption or the output gap. For high enough in￿ ation
rates, consumption and output are lower with ￿nancial intermediation than without. The reason:
With the possibility of borrowing, agents pay higher interest costs on their debts under higher
in￿ ation, which crowds out savings. Hence, in the steady state the levels of output and consumption
are lower, everything else equal. Thus, with moderate in￿ ation ￿nancial intermediation increases
aggregate consumption by relaxing borrowing constraints, and this e⁄ect dominates the interest
27e⁄ects on debt. But with high in￿ ation, the interest e⁄ects dominate, so the welfare gain is reversed.
Also, the larger the degree of heterogeneity, the higher are the output gains from ￿nancial
intermediation with moderate in￿ ation. For example, under the current calibration with ￿ = 1:5,
the welfare gain of banking is about 10 percent of aggregate consumption (or output) when the
in￿ ation rate is 2% a quarter (or 8% a year). If ￿ = 1:1, which is also consistent with the empirical
"money demand" curve estimated by Lucas (2000), the welfare gain becomes 68% of aggregate
consumption (or output) when in￿ ation is 2% a quarter, suggesting that the collapse of the banking
system can destroy as much as 68% of aggregate GDP for a su¢ ciently heterogeneous economy.
Interest Rates. The interest rate of credit does not necessarily equal nor comove with the rate
of return to liquidity (R) or the rate of yield on non-monetary assets (such as the capital stock).
More importantly, the gap depends positively on the rate of in￿ ation. For example, in the current
model, the steady-state rate of return to capital (the Fisherian fundamentals) is independent of
the in￿ ation rate, 1 + r = 1
￿, so the nominal rate of return to capital is given by 1+￿
￿ , which is the
same as the shadow rate of return to liquidity, R(￿￿). However, the nominal interest rate of loans
behaves very di⁄erently; it is given by 1 +~ { =
￿ ￿(￿)
￿(￿). Although both types of nominal rates increase
with in￿ ation, their elasticities di⁄er dramatically. For the nominal asset return this elasticity is
one, so the real rate is independent of in￿ ation. But the nominal loan rate has an elasticity larger
than one. Suppose we de￿ne the real rate of credit by 1+￿ {
1+￿; the right window in Figure 5 shows
that the real rate is still an increasing function of the in￿ ation rate. Because real money demand
decreases with in￿ ation (the left window in Figure 5), the relationship between money demand and
the real interest rate is negative.
The fact that the real loan rate is increasing with in￿ ation may appear puzzling because it
may suggest that the demand for loans is rising faster than the supply of deposits during in￿ ation.
However, the demand for real balances actually falls with in￿ ation. Hence, the true reason for the
real loan rate to increase with in￿ ation is because deposits (the supply of liquidity) shrink faster than
the decline of credit demand. Hence, (real) liquidity reserves in the banking system dry up more
quickly than credit demand when in￿ ation increases. The same mechanism explains the liquidity
trap. As in￿ ation falls, the supply of liquidity (deposits) rises faster than the demand for loans,
pushing down both the nominal and the real interest rates on credit. Under the Friedman rule,
the nominal rate becomes zero and the real rate becomes identical to the Fisherian fundamentals,
1+~ {
1+￿ = 1
￿. At this point there is still positive lending (B > 0), but the bank￿ s liquidity reserves
exceed the demand for loans despite the zero loan rate. In such a case, money injections will only
raise the excess supply of liquidity further without having any impact on the demand for loans
because the loan rate cannot be lowered further below zero (otherwise people will be better o⁄ by
28withdrawing deposits and keeping them at home).26
Figure 5. Money Demand and Real Interest Rate.
An important implication of the positive relationship between in￿ ation and the real loan rate is
that in￿ ation can be potentially far more costly than realized by the literature ￿not only lenders
but also borrowers may become losers during in￿ ation. The lenders lose their wealth because of
the in￿ ation tax, and the borrowers lose their income because of the high real interest payments.
3.3 Short-Run Dynamics and Monetary Business Cycle
The stochastic equilibrium path of the model is solved by log-linear approximation as in the bench-
mark model. Under the calibrated parameter values, the model has a unique stationary saddle path.
The impulse responses of the model to a one-percent transitory increase in the money stock (under
policy 21 with ￿ = 0:9) are graphed in Figure 6. It shows that transitory monetary shocks are
expansionary as in the benchmark model, but with magnitudes of the real variables about six times
larger. Hence, ￿nancial intermediation greatly ampli￿es the impact of monetary shocks through the
credit lending channel. These real e⁄ects can be further ampli￿ed if the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks are increased. For example, if ￿ = 1:1, then the real e⁄ects will be three times larger; that
26Notice that the nominal loan rate is identical to the Lagrangian multiplier on excess supply of liquidity (equation
74). Hence, ~ { re￿ ects the shadow value of liquidity. As in￿ ation rises, the excess supply falls; hence, the shadow value
of liquidity increases. On the other hand, as in￿ ation decreases, the excess supply of cash rises, driving down the
shadow value of liquidity until the zero lower bound, at which point we have Mt > Bt, i.e., money supply exceeds
loan demand.
29is, a one-percent increase in money stock can raise output by about 0:6 percent, consumption by
0:3 percent, and investment by 1:4 percent. The price level remains sluggish, albeit not as "sticky"
as in the benchmark model. Also, the nominal interest rate decreases for a prolonged period (see
the bottom middle window in Figure 6), capturing the so-called liquidity e⁄ect found in the data
(see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1995).
Figure 6. Impulse Responses to 1% Money Injection.
A selected set of predicted business-cycle statistics is reported in Table 1, along with their
counterparts of the U.S. sample (top row) and the predictions from a standard RBC model aug-
mented with capacity utilization (second row). For the postwar sample period, aggregate consump-
tion is less volatile than output, which in turn is less volatile than investment. In addition, the
consumption-velocity of money (de￿ned as the ratio of aggregate consumption to M1) is about
1:75 times more volatile than GDP in terms of standard deviations, and the correlation between
velocity and real money balances is ￿0:96. These stylized facts of the U.S. sample are well captured
by the model driven by monetary shocks (see the third row). In particular, the model predicts that
velocity should be about 1:6 times more volatile than output and its correlation with real money
balances should be about ￿1. In addition to the dynamic behaviors of velocity, the model driven
30by monetary shocks can generate comparable predictions for real activities to those of a standard
RBC model driven by technology shocks. For example, consumption is less volatile than output
while investment is more volatile than output. The bottom row shows the predictions of the model
when it is driven by technology shocks, which are similarly to the RBC model. That is, introduc-
ing money and heterogeneity into the model does not deteriorate the model￿ s performance under
technology shocks.








￿y ￿v;m ￿c;y ￿i;y ￿n;y ￿y;y-1 ￿c;c-1 ￿i;i-1 ￿n;n-1 ￿v;v-1
U.S.Data
(59:1￿08:4)
1.75 0.51 3.17 0.83 -0.96 0.82 0.79 0.80 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.94
RBC
(cap. util.)
n.a. 0.26 4.25 0.89 n.a. 0.52 0.98 0.96 0.84 0.98 0.83 0.83 n,a,
Model
(M shock)
1.58 0.78 2.10 1.10 -0.99 0.95 0.91 0.99 0.83 0.91 0.72 0.82 0.90
Model
(A shock)
0 0.31 4.24 0.89 0 0.49 0.97 0.95 0.72 0.98 0.69 0.69 0
￿U.S data (1959:1 - 2007:4) are real GDP, consumption of nondurable goods and services, business investment, aggregate
non-farm employment, and M1. Velocity is measured as the ratio of nominal consumption to M1. All data are HP ￿ltered.
"RBC" refers to representative-agent model with capacity utilization and indivisible labor (see, e.g., King and Rebelo, 2000).
4 Conclusion
This paper extends Bewley￿ s (1980) model to a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setting. The
generalized model is applied to study, among other things, the monetary business cycle, the welfare
costs of in￿ ation, the liquidity trap, the determination of the nominal interest rate, and the welfare
gains of ￿nancial intermediation. The most important ￿ndings include (i) transitory monetary
shocks have real expansionary e⁄ects despite their lump-sum nature and ￿ exible prices; (ii) the
welfare costs of in￿ ation can be astonishingly many times larger with heterogeneous agents than
with a representative agent; (iii) the liquidity trap is a natural general-equilibrium consequence of
liquidity preference in a banking economy; and (iv) welfare costs of the collapse of the banking
system can be potentially as large as 10 ￿ 68% of GDP, depending on the degree of heterogeneity
and the in￿ ation rate.
The neoclassical feature, especially the simplicity and analytical tractability of my model, makes
it a useful framework for studying the relationship between money on the one hand and capital
accumulation, asset pricing, banking and ￿nance, international trade, exchange rate determination,
wealth distribution, the business cycle and optimal government policies on the other hand. In this
regard, the particular advantage of this framework is that it becomes much easier to incorporate
and absorb many of the recent advances in the RBC literature and the New Keynesian literature.27
27For example, preliminary analysis shows that allowing for only a moderate degree of price stickiness in the model
can generate highly persistent output movements under shocks to the money growth rate.
31My analysis may shed new light on the liquidity preference theory of Keynes (1936), which is
perhaps the single most controversial issue in The General Theory. There Keynes presents liquidity
preference theory as a ￿liquidity theory of interest.￿According to Keynes, the proper place of the
theory of interest is at the level of portfolio decisions, and it is simple "arithmetic" to require
that interest rates must be such that the general public￿ s desire to hold money be determined
at the margin given the amount of liquidity the banking system decides to provide. Given the
crucial importance of interest rates in a⁄ecting the real economy through asset prices and ￿nancial
decisions, the key practical matter for Keynes is how deliberate monetary control can be applied to
attain acceptable real performance. To sort out these problems and the possible confusions caused
by Keynes himself, there is the need to formulate a liquidity preference-based model of money and
banking in which currency, reserves, deposits, credit, and loans can be studied explicitly in a choice-
theoretic dynamic general-equilibrium setting. For related reasons, Lucas (2000, p. 270) emphasizes
that "[s]uch a model is essential if one wants to consider policies like reserve requirements, interest
on deposits, and other measures that a⁄ect di⁄erent components of the money stock di⁄erently."
Hopefully, the model presented in this paper is a promising start in this direction.
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